This Recommendation specifies techniques for the derivation of master keys from passwords or passphrases to protect stored electronic data or data protection keys.
Recommendation for Password-Based Key Derivation

Introduction
The randomness of cryptographic keys is essential for the security of cryptographic applications. In some applications, such as the protection of electronically stored data, passwords may be the only input required from the users who are eligible to access the data. Due to the low entropy and possibly poor randomness of those passwords, they are not suitable to be used directly as cryptographic keys.
This Recommendation specifies a family of password-based key derivation functions (PBKDFs) for deriving cryptographic keys from passwords or passphrases for the protection of electronically-stored data or for the protection of data protection keys.
Authority
This publication has been developed by the National Institute of Standards and 
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Definitions, Acronyms and Symbols
Definitions
Approved FIPS-approved and/or NIST-recommended. An algorithm or technique that is 1) specified in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation; or 2) adopted in a FIPS or NIST Recommendation; or 3) specified in a list of NIST-approved security functions.
Authenticated encryption
A function in which plaintext is encrypted into ciphertext, and a MAC is generated on the plaintext or ciphertext and, optionally, on associated data that is not encrypted.
Cryptographic algorithm
A well-defined computational procedure that takes variable inputs that may include a cryptographic key to provide confidentiality, data integrity, authentication and/or non-repudiation.
Cryptographic key (key)
A binary string that is used as a parameter by a cryptographic algorithm.
Data protection key A key or a set of keys used to protect or recover data, verify the authenticity or integrity of the protected data or to protect the private key used to generate digital signatures.
Decryption
The process of transforming ciphertext into plaintext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Digest size
The output length of a hash function.
Encryption
The process of transforming plaintext into ciphertext using a cryptographic algorithm and key.
Entropy A measure of the amount of uncertainty in an unknown value.
Iteration count
The number of times that the pseudorandom function is called to generate a block of keying material.
Key See cryptographic key.
Key derivation
In this Recommendation, key derivation is the process of deriving keying material from a key or password.
Keying material A binary string, such that any non-overlapping segments of the string with the required lengths can be used as symmetric cryptographic keys.
Master key
In this Recommendation, a master key is the keying material that is output from an execution of the PBKDF.
Message (Data) authentication
A mechanism to provide assurance of the origin and integrity of a message.
Message authentication code
A cryptographic checksum that is generated on data using a cryptographic algorithm that is parameterized by a symmetric key. The message authentication code is designed to provide data origin authentication and detect both accidental errors and the intentional modification of the data. Also called an authentication tag.
Password A character string known only by a specific entity (e.g., a user) that is used to authenticate the identity of a computer system user and/or to authorize access to system resources. In this Recommendation, a password is used to derive keying material.
Passphrase A collection of words (typically more than 20 characters), that is used to authenticate the identity of a computer system user and/or to authorize access to system resources. In this Recommendation, when "passphrase" is not mentioned with "password", the use of "passphrase" is implied.
Protect data To encrypt, authenticate, or both encrypt and authenticate data.
Pseudorandom Function
A function that can be used to generate output from a random seed and a data variable, such that the output is computationally indistinguishable from truly random output.
Recover data To decrypt ciphertext data and/or to verify the authenticity of data.
Salt A non-secret binary value that is used as an input to the key derivation function PBKDF specified in this Recommendation to allow the generation of a large set of keys for a given password.
Shall
This term is used to indicate a requirement that must be fulfilled to claim conformance to this Recommendation. Note that shall may be coupled with not to become shall not.
PBKDF
Password-based Key Derivation Function SHA Secure Hash Algorithm
Symbols
Symbol Meaning  Bit-wise exclusive-or.
||
Concatenation.
 a
The ceiling of a: the smallest integer that is greater than or equal to a. For example, 5 = 5, 5.3 = 6, and -2.1 = -2.
hLen The length of the output of PRF in bits.
Int(i) 32-bit encoding of integer i, with the most significant bit on the left.
kLen
The length of the output of PBKDF in bits.
len
An integer that represents the number of PRF output blocks to be concatenated in order to obtain kLen bits of MK, i.e., len = kLen / hLen mk The MK derived using the PBKDF. P A password or passphrase, represented as a binary string.
purpose A binary string defined for a specific application, message or a user which is optionally prepended to the randomly generated part of the salt.
rv
The randomly generated part of the salt.
S
The salt, represented as a binary string.
sLen
The length of the salt in bits.
T<0, 1, …, r-1>
The truncation of the binary string T that retains its first r bits.
General Discussion
This Recommendation specifies a family of functions to derive cryptographic keying material from a password or a passphrase. The derived keying material is called a Master Key (MK), denoted as mk. The MK is used either 1) to generate one or more Data
Protection Keys (DPKs) to protect data, or 2) to generate an intermediate key to protect one or more existing DPKs or generated from the MK using an approved Key Derivation Function (KDF) as defined in [2] . The MK shall not be used for other purposes.
Password-Based Key Derivation Functions
A password or a passphrase is a string of characters that is usually chosen by a user.
Passwords are often used to authenticate a user in order to allow access to a resource.
Since most user-chosen passwords have low entropy and weak randomness properties, as discussed in Appendix A.1, these passwords shall not be used directly as cryptographic keys. However, in certain applications, such as protecting data in storage devices, the password may be the only secret information that is available to the cryptographic algorithm that protects the data. This section specifies a family of PBKDFs for such applications.
KDFs are deterministic algorithms that are used to derive cryptographic keying material from a secret value, such as a password. Each PBKDF in the family is defined by the choice of a Pseudorandom Function (PRF) and a fixed iteration count, denoted as C. The input to an execution of PBKDF includes a password, denoted as P, a salt, denoted as S,
and an indication of the desired length of the MK in bits, denoted as kLen. Symbolically:
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The kLen value shall be at least 112 bits in length.
A generic diagram of the PBKDF is given in Figure 1 . The design rationale on generic PBKDFs is available in Appendix A.2. 
The Salt (S)
All or a portion of the salt shall be generated using an approved Random Bit Generator (e.g., see [5] ). The length of the randomly-generated portion of the salt shall be at least 128 bits.
More information on the length and optional format of the salt is available in Appendix A.2.1.
The Iteration Count (C)
The iteration count C is a fixed value that determines how many times the PRF iterates to generate one block of the MK. The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users. Since the capability of user machines varies (e.g., from a smart card to highend workstations or servers), reasonable iteration counts vary accordingly. A minimum iteration count of 1,000 is recommended. For especially critical keys, or for very powerful systems or systems where user-perceived performance is not critical, an iteration count of 10,000,000 may be appropriate.
More information on the selection of the iteration count is available in Appendix A.2.2.
PBKDF Specification
The following algorithm for the derivation of MKs from passwords is based on an algorithm specified in [6] , where it was specified as PBKDF2 and used HMAC [1] with SHA-1 as a PRF. This Recommendation approves PBKDF2 as the PBKDF using HMAC with any approved hash function as the PRF. The digest size of the hash function in bits is denoted as hLen.
The details of the PBKDF algorithm are given below. 
Input
Using the Derived Master Key to Protect Data
In this section, two options will be provided to protect data using an MK. In both options, a DPK is used to protect electronically-stored data, and the correctness of the DPK shall be verified. Figure 3 summarizes a general procedure for password-based key derivation to access protected data (or apply protection to the data) with the two options.
Note that if the DPK is compromised, it is necessary to recover (e.g., decrypt) the data and re-protect (e.g., re-encrypt) that data using a new password and/or a new DPK.
Option 1:
In this option, there are two ways to derive DPKs from MKs: in Option 1a, the MK (or a segment of the MK) is used directly as the DPK, whereas in Option 1b, the DPK is derived from the MK using a KDF. Note that the DPK may be a set of keys used for encryption and integrity.
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If only encryption is applied to the plaintext data, and the data size is large, in order to detect an incorrect entry of the password without decrypting the whole data on the storage medium, a prefix value (e.g., a string of zeros) might be prepended to the plaintext data prior to encryption. If this method is used, the password would be checked by decrypting the part of the ciphertext data containing the prefix value and comparing the result against the expected value of the prefix.
Changing a password changes the associated DPK(s). Therefore, whenever a password is changed, any data that is protected by the retiring password shall be recovered (e.g., decrypted) using the appropriate DPK that is associated with the retiring password, and then re-protected (e.g., encrypted) using the appropriate DKP that is associated with the revised password. 
Option 2:
In the second option, randomly generated DPKs are protected in one of two ways. In
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Option 2a, an MK (or a portion of an MK) that is generated from the password is used directly to protect the DPK. In Option 2b, an MK (or a portion of an MK) that is generated from the password is used to derive keying material using an approved KDF, and the derived keying material (or portion of the derived keying material) is used to protect the DPK.
The means to protect the DPK(s) shall use an approved authenticated encryption mode, such as one of the modes that is defined in [3, 4] , or a NIST-approved encryption algorithm/mode in conjunction with a NIST-approved authentication scheme.
The use of an approved authenticated encryption mode, or equivalent combination, allows the detection of an incorrect MK or incorrect derived keying material and, by extension, an incorrect password, thus avoiding the lengthy process of decrypting the protected data using an incorrect DPK. Depending on the method that is used to protect the DPK(s), data in addition to the salt and counter (e.g., an initialization vector) may need to be made available for decryption and encryption purposes (see Appendix A.3).
For options 2a and 2b, changing a password changes the key that protects the associated DPK(s). Therefore, whenever a password is changed, any DPK that is protected by the retiring password shall be recovered (e.g., decrypted) using the MK or the derived keying material that is associated with the retiring password, and then re-protected (e.g., encrypted) using the appropriate MK or the derived keying material that is associated with a new password.
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A.2 PBKDF
Dictionary attacks aim to recover passwords by trying the most-likely strings, such as the words in a dictionary. These attacks are less likely to succeed against passwords that include random combinations of upper/lowercase letters and numeric values. Such passwords can only be recovered using inefficient brute force attacks that try all possible passwords.
The main idea of a PBKDF is to slow dictionary or brute force attacks on the passwords by increasing the time needed to test each password. An attacker with a list of likely passwords can evaluate the PBKDF using the known iteration counter and the salt. Since an attacker has to spend a significant amount of computing time for each try, it becomes harder to apply the dictionary or brute force attacks.
A.2.1 Length of the Salt
The purpose of the salt is to allow the generation of a large set of keys corresponding to each password, for a fixed iteration count. For a given password, the number of possible resulting keys is approximately 2 sLen , where sLen is the length of the salt in bits.
Therefore, using a salt makes it difficult for the attacker to generate a table of resulting keys, for even a small subset of the most-likely passwords.
Optionally, to avoid any possible interaction between other applications that use a salt, an application-, message-or user-specific variable called purpose may be prefixed to the randomly generated part of the salt as given below; S = purpose || rv.
A.2.2 Iteration Count
The purpose of the iteration count C is to increase the amount of computation needed to derive a key from a password, significantly increasing the workload of dictionary attacks.
Using a PBKDF that requires C iterations to derive a key increases the computational cost of performing a dictionary attack on a password with t bits of entropy from 2 t operations to C2 t operations, and therefore, makes dictionary and brute force attacks
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However, the computation required for key derivation by legitimate users also increases with the number of iterations. The user may perceive this increase, for example, in the time required for authentication, or in the time to access the protected data on the storage medium. There is an obvious tradeoff: larger iteration counts make attacks more costly, but hurt performance for the authorized user. The number of iterations should be set as high as can be tolerated for the environment, while maintaining acceptable performance.
Acceptable performance is a function of the capabilities of the system doing the key derivation and the application. For example, consider a "whole disk" drive encryption application that boots a laptop computer from an encrypted drive, a fairly common application for password-based key derivation. The overall cold boot process, from the time the laptop is turned on until the system is loaded and available for use, may require thirty seconds to two minutes, and involve an operating system-level user authentication, as well as the entry of the boot password. A cold boot of a system is a relatively infrequent event. In such an application, it would be reasonable to set an iteration count that required a second on the target machine, because the delay introduced would be small compared to the overall boot time.
At the other extreme, assume that a key is to be created as required for specific transactions, and that a user may do this many times an hour. The time to open the file independently of the password entry and key derivation is only a second or two. In this case, a delay of more than a second for the derivation of the key from the password will be apparent and annoying to the user. This suggests that the iteration count should not add more than a quarter of a second on the target machine.
If the key derivation is to be performed on a server, then performance may be harder to gauge, and may depend on the peak load of the server. In many cases, however, even on servers, key derivation is only done once for a long session, and in these circumstances, a user-apparent delay of several seconds for key derivation may be tolerable.
A.3 Protection of DPK
The use of an authenticated encryption scheme or a NIST-approved encryption algorithm/mode in conjunction with a NIST-approved authentication scheme aims to protect both the authenticity and secrecy of a DPK. For example, in Option 2 (see Section 5.4), a DPK could be protected using an authenticated encryption scheme. If the user enters an incorrect password, it is impossible to generate the correct MK. However, using an incorrect MK results in a failure during the authentication process used in recovering DPK.
The additional variables needed to recover a DPK using the mechanisms specified in [3, 4] (e.g., initialization vectors, key length) may be stored on the hard drive or another storage device. The protection of these additional variables is not necessary.
Appendix B Conformance to "Non-testable" Requirements
Conformance to many of the requirements in this Recommendation is testable by NIST's CAVP or CMVP. However, some requirements are out-of-scope for such testing. This appendix lists those requirements whose conformance is the responsibility of entities using, implementing, installing or configuring applications or protocols that incorporate this Recommendation. The MK shall not be used for other purposes. 5 …these passwords shall not be used directly as cryptographic keys.
5.2
The iteration count shall be selected as large as possible, as long as the time required to generate the key using the entered password is acceptable for the users.
5.4
Therefore, whenever a password is changed, any data that is protected by the retiring password shall be recovered (e.g., decrypted) using the appropriate DPK that is associated with the retiring password, and then re-protected (e.g., encrypted) using the appropriate DKP that is associated with the revised password.
